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GERALDINE M. DAVIS, ) 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
. ;..-.,, . . STATEMENT OF THE NAT! JRE 
OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Geraldine M. Davis, appeals from an 
01: d e i: c i: ci e i: i i i g 11 i a t a ] ] p e r m a n e i: 11 r i g!: I t s o f • • • • • •»?. •. • r , 
Geraldine M. Davis (Winger) including residual rights, 
be permanently and completely terminated pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 55-10-109, as amended 1953. The case 
was tried before the Honorable John Farr Larson, pre-
siding in the Second District Juvenile court, Salt Lake 
County. 
DISPOSITION" IN THE I .OWER COURT ' • , 
->• November c, 1-3 75, the Second J> tri ct Juvenile. 
• - * - * - permanent rights of the mother, • 
2 
Geraldine M. Davis (Winger), including residual rights, 
be permanently and completely terminated. The lower 
Court further ordered that the State Division of Family 
Services is authorized and directed to make permanent 
plans, including adoption if possible, for the child, 
Ricky Winger,, Thereafter, appellant filed notice of 
Appeal on December 5, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in her favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The minor child, Ricky Winger, was born December 31, 
1973. Following his birth and release from the hospital, 
he remained with his parents until March 8, 1974, when 
the police removed him for his protection while his par-
ents were involved in a serious argument. 
The child is microcephalic, hypotonic (lack of mus-
cle tone), motor delayed and mentally retarded. 
Geraldine M. Davis is the twenty four year old 
mother of the child, Ricky Winger. Appellant has full 
scale I.Q. of 52, with a verbal I.Q. of 61 and performance 
I.Q. of 46, placing her in the mental defective range 
at a level of trainable, mentally retarded. 
The proceedings in the Second District Juvenile 
3 
Court were brought pursuant to petitions of both parents 
of the child, for return of custody and guardianship 
and on the petition of the State seeking permanent ter-
mination of parental rights and in support thereof, al-
leging pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 55-10-109 (l)(a)/ 
as amended 1953, that "the parents are unfit or incom-
petent by reason of conduct or condition seriously det-
rimental to the child.11 
Although during the proceedings in the Second Dis-
trict Juvenile Court there was no proof that Ricky 
Winger had ever been abused or neglected, the lower Court 
ruled in favor of the State and against both parents and 
found that appellant was mentally and emotionally unable 
to provide the child with proper care and stability and 
ordered that all parental rights of appellant in the 
child Ricky Winger be permanently and completely ter-
minated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN DE-
PRIVING THE MOTHER OF THE MINOR CHILD, RICKY 
WINGER OF ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THAT SAID DE-
CISION WAS BASED ONLY UPON FEAR THAT THE MOTHER 
MIGHT IN THE FUTURE HARM THE MINOR CHILD OR 
OTHERWISE BE UNABLE TO PROPERLY CARE FOR THE 
CHILD, NOT THAT SHE HAD EVER HARMED THE CHILD 
IN THE PAST OR BEEN NECESSARILY UNABLE TO PRO-
PERLY CARE FOR THE CHILD IN THE PAST. 
Appellant was permanently deprived of the custody 
4 
of her minor child, Ricky Winger, pursuant to § 55-10-109 
(l)(a), by finding that appellant, the natural parent, 
was "unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or con-
dition seriously detrimental to the child." However, 
in implementing this statute the Juvenile Court is re-
quired to follow the general guidelines of the Juvenile 
Court Act of 1965 wherein, in section 63, is stated the 
purpose of the act: ' < - - *- ' * •" 
"It is the stated purpose of this act to secure 
for each child coming before the Juvenile Court 
such care, guidance, and control, preferably 
in his own home, as will serve his welfare and the 
* best interest of the State; to preserve and 
strengthen family ties whenever.possible...." 
The phraseology of, "preferably in his own home," 
"and to preserve and strengthen family ties" indicates 
that there exists in this State a fundamental prefer-
ence for keeping the family unit together. The case 
law also strongly supports this notion. In the Utah 
case of In re State in the Interest of L.J»J., 11 Utah 
2d 393, 360 P.2d 486, at 488, the Court stated; 
"Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly recog-
nized that there is a presumption that it will 
be for the best interest of the child to be 
raised under the custody, control and super-
vision of his natural parents...the ultimate 
burden of proof on this question is always in 
favor of the natural parents and against any 
other-->person seeking custody of such child, 
in addition thereto, this presumption is based 
on logic, and experience shows generally that 
5 
parents have more love, devotion and regard for 
their own children than do father people." 
The Court in another opinion, State in the Interest 
of F-,D* and P- v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948, at 
949, states: 
"We are entirely in agreement with the presumption 
in which appellant seeks refuge, that it is gen-
erally for the best interest and welfare of the 
child to be reared under the care of their natural 
parents; are appreciative of the mutual advantages 
to be found in the love, affection, and interest 
which parent and children normally show each other; 
.and of the seeming harshness of allowing the law 
to step in and deprive them of these values. That 
the cutting of family ties is a step of the utmost 
gravity which should be done only for the most com-
pelling reasons is not to be questiond. This is 
even more true because to do so results in relieving 
the natural parents of the duty to support and care 
for their offspring and places the burden upon the 
State. Everyone will concede that this is unde-
sireable, both socially and economically, and there-
fore to be avoided unless that is the only alter-
native to be found consistent with the best interest 
of the children.*1 
The Court goes further at page 950 in the same 
case and states concerning the deprivation of the parents' 
custody of children, "we agree that this is a drastic 
remedy which should be resorted to only in extreme cases 
and when it is manifest that the chome cannot and will not 
support such an "extreme case" in the situation of the 
appellant as will be shown below. ' •:.:^,/;-.. 
It is clear that the legislature intaiided by 
enacting the foregoing stipulation 
6 
that this Court has always so construed the Juvenile 
Court Act to hold that the purpose of the legislation 
should be accomplished by working with the parents and 
children within the home and to preserve the family°s 
status whenever possible, and that children should not 
be removed from the home or from custody of their parents 
before it becomes apparent that conditions exist in the 
home which are "seriously detrimental" to the welfare 
of the child.: V/,,,-,,,;..a :
 r.. , , .t ... • '.- . ;-
"One of the basic tenets of our system of law and 
justice is that it attempts to accord to all individuals 
protection in their persons and property, and this is 
true, a fortiori, of children." State in interest of 
K-B-, 326 Utah 2d 398,- 326 P.2d 395. The Juvenile Court 
is the agency of our government which is given the pri-
mary responsibility for the protection of children and 
it is given broad powers of discretion in determining 
the custody of a child. However, this Court has re-
peatedly cautioned the Juvenile Courts to exercise sound 
judgment in use of the discretion in them vested and has 
set certain limits on such discretion. In State in the 
Interest of K-B-, supra, at 397, the Court stated: 
"It seems plain that the intended purpose to be 
divined from the statutes above quoted is that the 
Juvenile Court has authority to permanently deprive 
7 
parents of the custody of the children when cir-
cumstances make such action necessary for their 
protection and welfare. In so concluding we are 
aware that such power is indeed awesome in the 
effect it may have upon the lives of the persons 
involved. It should be administered with sound 
discretion and with due regard for the presumption 
that the natural parent is the proper custodian of 
his child, in that it is the policy of the Courts 
to be reluctant to deprive parents of their child-r 
ren.,f 
Although it is clear that an extremely strong pre-
sumption exists in favor of the natural parents, this 
Court has held that it will not distrub the findings 
and determination of the Juvenile Court unless it is 
found that they are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence or that it is plainly manifest that the Juvenile 
Court abused its discretion. State in interest of 
F-,D-and P- v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 947 at 951. 
In the instant case it is apparent that such dis-
cretion was abused by the Juvenile Court. The record 
indicates that the Court found that appellant by reason 
of being mentally and emotionally retarded would be unable 
to properly care for her child. This decision was based 
largely upon the testimony of Dr. Liebroder, the psy-
cologist who examined the mother. The Court also heard 
testimony from three other witnesses? a supervisor 
of foster care in the Division of Family Services, a 
case worker with Division of Family Services, and another 
8 
case worker with the Division of Family Services, who all 
testified that it was their opinion that appellant was 
not able to properly care for the child, Ricky Winger. 
The Juvenile Court Judge also noted as part of the basis 
for his finding of the present condition of the mother 
the fact that he had observed her at often times engaging 
in inappropriate conduct in the Courtroom. However, 
the Juvenile Court's observation of the mother's tem-
perment during the trial should certainly not be re-
garded as being evidence of the mother's normal behavior. 
In fact, this was the subject of a discussion by the 
Federal District Court of the District of Columbia where 
a mother had repeatedly and in contempt of Court inter-
rupted the Judge holding the hearing. The Court dis-
missed the mother's conduct, stating that such inter-
ruptions of Court "might have been no more than the 
natural acts of a distraught mother." Re Stuart (1940), 
72 App DC 389, 114 F.2d 825. ; tr 
The reason for the Juvenile Court's abuse of dis-
cretion lies in the fact that there was also substantial 
evidence adduced at the Juvenile Court hearings that 
appellant would be able with help to properly care for 
her child and that in fact she had cared for him ade-
quately in the past without help. Marshall Perkins, 
9 
M.S.W. and PhJD., a psyschologist, testified that he saw 
appellant as immature with some emotional instability, 
but that he did not see this as being dangerous to the 
child, and disagreed with the State's position to per-
manently terminate the mother's parental rights. 
Mrs. Evelyn Holts, a Nutrition Aid from the Extension 
Service, testified that the mother became easily ex-
cited, but that the mother did a fairly adequate job of 
bathing, dressing and getting the child to sleep after 
his bath. It was her opinion also that the mother would 
need supervisory help to care for the child, but with 
the mother's temper she was fearful of the child's safety. 
However, there was no probf that in the time the child 
was cared for by his mother that the mother had ever lost 
her temper with the child or that she had ever harmed 
or abused the child. 
Mr. Kenneth Salzman, M.S.W., saw the mother as self-
centered and retarded but able to function with help. He 
did not see her as harmful to the child. 
Mr. and Mrs. Waldo J. Harris, testified that they 
had had ample opportunity to observe appellant with her 
baby. They both testified that they had never noticed 
any harm to the baby and indicated that the mother was 
very tender-hearted and testified that they thought the 
10 
mother could be a good mother. 
Also in appellant9s favor was the fact that, during 
the course of the Juvenile Court hearings she married one 
John Davis. The Court noted that Mr. Davis had some 
stability, having held a job for a number of years. 
Mr. Davis also testified that he thought that appellant 
would make a good wife and mother. : 
There was no evidence introduced at any time during 
the hearings to substantiate any claim that appellant had 
ever in the past harmed, abused or neglected the child. 
Yet in spite of this the Juvenile Court still terminated 
appellant's parental rights in her child. 
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that 
a very strong presumption exists both by statute and by 
case law in Utah that the parent is the best guardian of 
his or her child. It is also apparent that the Juvenile 
Court possesses a wide latitude of discretion in deter-
mining child custody matters but that this discretion ^ 
must be closley guarded to prevent abuse. It is clear 
that in this case such discretion was abused by the 
Juvenile Court in that the evidence adduced at the Court 
clearly did not preponderate to the extent necessary to 
overcome this presumption on two different, distinct 
grounds. V'X\V •. ,,,,' * .; 
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First, in addition to the testimony of the State's 
witnesses there was substantial testimony that appellant 
would be properly able to care for her child with help. 
Certainly, appellant is entitled to an opportunity and 
a chance to have some assistance provided for her to 
care for her own child in her home, "since the right 
of a parent, under natural law, to establish a home and 
bring up children is a fundamental one and beyond the 
reach of any Court. ,f Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042. Affording 
her such an opportunity is certainly harmonious with the 
purpose of the Juvenile Court Act and the Utah cases 
previously cited. Appellant is entitled to the op-
portunity to raise her child, even with help if neces-
sary, and the Juvenile Court under these circumstances 
should not be allowed to deprive her of this fundamental 
right. 
Second, the Juvenile Court abused its discretion 
in terminating appellant's parental rights without any 
evidence of past abuse or neglect by the mother. In 
fact, appellant evidenced just the opposite during the 
four months that the child was still in her custody. 
The evidence showed that appellant did an adequate job 
of caring for her child. The State's witnesses to a 
12 
large extent based, their opinion that the child would 
be unsafe in the mother's hands on the fact that the 
mother, in their opinion, became easily frustrated. 
However/ any parent of small children can easily test-
ify that the times when a parent is liable to become the 
most greatly frustrated with a child is probably when the 
child is less than two years old. Ricky Winger is now 
almost 2 1/2 years old> well past this frustrating age. 
"No Juvenile Court can, for any but the gravest reasons, 
transfer a child from its natural parent to any other 
person." People ex rel Portnoy v. Strasser, 104 N#E. 
2d 895 at 896, 303 N.Y. 539 at 538, Meyer v. Nebraska, 
supra. It is clear that in this case such "grave reasons" 
do not exist. Appellant is now married to a man of 
stability, she is able to provide a proper home for 
the child and evidence introduced at the hearings showed 
that she could, with help if needed, properly and ade-
quately care for her child. Several cases concerning 
the removal of children from the custody of their parents 
have been reviewed by this Court. In every case examined 
where the Juvenile Court's termination of parental rights 
had been affirmed it was found that the parent who was 
to be deprived of custody had in the past abused or neg-
lected the child* No case had been found wherein a parent 
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was deprived of custody without there having been proof 
of some j: >ast abuse or:1 neglect of the chi Id In fact 
this Court has gone even further and returned custody 
of minor cl i:i ldre i: 1 t :o the r latura] parent where the Ju \/eni ] e 
Court had found that the parents had in the past neglected 
the child, such as where a parent had failed to provide 
dental care for two minor children even after being 
advised of the need for such care, State in Interest of 
Inez Pilli ng v,» Lance 2 3 1 Jtah 2d 407 (1 970) 464 P. 2d 
395. 
The State :i i i I :! le J uvenile Cour t proceedings fai ] ed 
to overcome the presumption i n the favor of the natural 
.parent, "n so doing the Juvenile Court abused its d:i se-
cretion in finding that appellant was "unfit or incom-
petent by reason of conduct or condition seriously " ' 
detriment .a] 1 .o t ,1 i< a < : :1 :i :i ] J :1 " Therefore the judgment : o i: ."' '.' '•• 
the Second District Juvenile Cou rt should be reversed 
a n d c u s t o d y « : >. I: 1 J ic < : 1: :i i ] i R :i .ck* \ 7inge M: , re tun led to .'.' 
appellant. 
UTAH-CODE ANNOTATED § 55«10-109# as amended 1953, 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
AND THAT IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE MANNER IN 
WHICH IT WAS IMPLEMENTED AGAINST APPELLANT. 
The statute in question violates appellant's right 
to due process by establishing a standard which is impos-
14 
* 
sible for appellant to ascertain in advance .and makes 
a finding of a Court adverse to the appellant a drastic 
and traumatic occurrence. Indeed it could be said that 
there exists no civil penalty more drastic and traumatic. 
v Due to the seriousness of the penalty involved, and 
due to the nature of the proceedings wherein the State 
versus an individual in a criminal type proceeding, this 
type of statute should be subject to the same degree of 
clarity to which criminal statutes are subject. In 
United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, the United States 
Supreme Court made it clear that criminal statutes must 
be definite as to the persons within the scope of the e 
statutes and the acts which are penalized. In Musser v. 
Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948), the Supreme Court considered 
a charge of conspiracy to violate public morals under 
sub-section (5) Utah Code Annotated § 103-11-1, as 
Amended 1943, and said: 
"Legislation may run afoul' of the Due Process 
Clause because it fails to give adequate guidance 
to those who would be law-abiding, to advise de-
fendants of the nature of the offense with which 
they are charged, or to guide courts in trying 
those who are accused." 
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, that 
section, was delcared unconstitutional. State v. 
Musser, 223 P.2d 193 (Utah). 
15 
The section in question is just as ambigious as the 
statute struck down in the Musser case. It states simply 
that "the Court may decree a termination of all parental 
rights with 'respect to one or both par ents :i f the Court 
finds: (a) "If the parent or parents are unfit ox 
i n e oixip e t en t by r e a s on o f c ondu c t o r c ond i t i on s e r i on s 1 y 
detrimental to the child." § 55-10-109 (1)(a). Such 
a standard is totally vague and ambiguous. Nothing 
is stated concerning what standards are to be used to 
determine whether or not a parent is "incompetent by 
reason of conduct or: conditi on st "re^sly dr»^ i;r.--n?'-;jl "-'•v'-
to the child," An argument could be -ndde *:nnt: a more ''';'^-
def ina to .:m:i st rioU. y defined standard is impossible ' 
given the nature of such castes. This argument, however, 
serves only to point out the fact that the Juvenile . : 
Court itself really has no idea under what circumstan :s 
i t will find that a parent is incompetent to care for his 
child. The result is that the parent has no i dea what •"••': 
conduct constitutes a violation of the statute in question. 
In Lanzetta va New Jersey,306 U 0S 0 451 , the Supreme Court ' 
held that a statute must bo sufficiently explicit to in-
form those subject, Ic iL as to whdt conduct vill render 
them liable to its penalties, and a statute forbidding 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-
mon intelligence must necessari 1 y cji iess at i 1 .s meaning 
16 
and differ as to its application is violative of due pro-
c e s s . . . ; •:.• •,r;^rv|;.'-. ; ,\--- .(;. : - • . ••/,..,.— ;. \ • •;,: - r? / ••••, -r\ • •..-;:•:- r •'•:••.;>. o .- . .-.. 
This problem is extremely aggravated by the instant 
case where the Juvenile Court found a "condition seri-
ously detrimental to the child." Appellant's custody 
was terminated solely because she had the misfortune 
to be born mentally retarded and not on any past conduct 
on her part. , , 
§ 55-10-109 further denies appellant herein equal 
protection under the law in that it establishes an arbitrary 
class of conduct and the inclusion of appellant denies 
appellant of the "basic and fundamental right of a 
parent under natural law, to establish a home and bring -
up children." Meyer v. State of Nebraska, supra. It / 
would appear that the Juvenile Court has construed the -
statute so as to create a class of people who are to 
be considered incompetent to exercise the valuable and 
fundamental right of parenthood and therefore denies 
them the same. The class included by this statute M ; 
then is the class of mentally retarded people. 
Our Courts have sustained certain classifications 
when reasonable. However, the Supreme Court has made 
justification much more stringent where the inclusion 
within the class denies a basic right. The Supreme 
Court and this Court have held that the right to 
1/ 
parenthood is an extremely fundamental right and that all 
the presumptions lie in favor of the competency of a 
natural parent to be the guardian of his children and 
that the State will terminate this right only for the 
gravest compelling reasons. Meyer v _ State of_Nefaraska, 
supra, People ex rel Portnoy v. Strasser, supra, State in 
1 nteres t__of_KrB-/ supra
 0 '.•:;:•.;/ , •*-•'..> ." •• 
It is submitted that the classification used by the 
Juvenile Court for termination of appellant's parental .,.y:-. 
rights was clearly arbitrary. It can be argued that , 
the ruling of the Juvenile Court was not arbitrary in 
that extensive hearings were conducted on the matter.^'^-e-
in the Juvenile Court before it ordered appellant ss 
parental rights terminated,. However, this further ac- " ; 
cents appellant 8s point that the ruling was arbitrary. 
Even after: such extensive hearings, there was still •';••• .y 
no evidence that appellant had ever neglected or abused••.;,.-• 
L.he child. The evidence was in fact that in the past 
she had done a fairly adequate job of caring for her >•.-.•., 
child. Such an arbitrary ruling clearly violates 
appellant's rights to equal prot .ection under the law as 
well as constituting an abuse of the discretion vested 
in the Juvenile Court,, ., •:.••.-.-• .' • -" •,•• - - ,- : 
Appellant is certainly aware that the statute in-
volved LLJ intended to protect children from the poten-
tial of abuse or neglect of a parent. Such protection < 
18 
however, can and must be provided without the deprivation 
of the parent's constitutional rights and these rights 
have been violated where there was evidence that appellant 
had done an adequate job of caring for her child in the 
past without evidence of any abuse or neglect. 
§ 55-10-109 (1)(a) then is unconstitutional as 
applied to appellant because it denies a parent his 
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process 
of law by establishing a standard which is vague and ; 
ambiguous and impossible for any person to ascertain in 
advance. This is especially true in the instant case 
where the condition found to be seriously detrimental 
to the child was the mother's mental retardation with 
no finding that appellant had ever abused or neglected 
her child in the past and that in fact there was evi-
dence to show that in the past appellant had been a 
good mother and had done an adequate job in providing 
and caring for her child. l 
CONCLUSION 6 r 
The appellant respectfully submits that the 
Juvenile Court abused the discretion vested in it when 
it terminated all parental rights of appellant in the 
minor child, Ricky Winger. This decision was clearly 
against the weight of the evidence in that, first, 
there was evidence that the mother could in the future 
19 
property care for her child if given help and cnat •.•~.-
she had done an adequate job in the past without help. 
Second, there was no proof that appellant had ever .-• ..• 
neglected or abused her .child in the past. 
Appellant further submits that § 55-10-109 (1) (a) -.-• 
is unconsti ti itiona] oi I i ts face and as applied to . 
appellant* First, the statute is vague and ambiguous - • 
on its face and sets no guidelines for any reasonably ~, 
prudent person to determine what constitutes a violation 
of the standards that this statute is designed to enforce. 
Second, the statute is unconstitutional as applied to 
appellant in that it has been used to create an arbitrary 
c Massification (mental retardation), and the inclusion 
of appellant therein has deprived her of one of the 
most basi c and fundamental ..rights afforded to every 
person: the right to parenthood. 
The removal of a child from its natural mother 
is a most drastic and traumatic action. No greater 
property right or right in life is involved in any other 
judicial action. When such a drastic step becom.es 
necessary it should be based upon good sound evidence 
of record dul y considered in appropriate judicial . • . 
circumstances., Tne record as is now before this Court 
IUIJ, r > ;..» evidence considered by the Juvenile 
20 
Court was not sufficient to overcome the presumptions 
of law afforded the natural parents of minor children 
and that the Juvenile Court abused the discretion in it 
vested by terminating all parental rights of appellant. 
Concern for proper judicial administration and due concern 
for the fundamental rights of appellant to raise her 
natural child requires that this Court reverse the 
decision of the Juvenile Court and return custody of the 
child Ricky Winger to his mother. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALE R. KENT 
Attorney for Petitioner-
Appellant 
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